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KANT’S IDEALISM AND PHENOMENALISM.
CRITICAL NOTICE OF LUCY ALLAIS’S
MANIFEST REALITY.
KANT’S IDEALISM & HIS REALISM*
Dennis Schulting
he articles with which Lucy Allais made her name as Kant expert in the mid- to
late nineties have now been updated and partially rewritten for her first mono-
graph, which deals with all the aspects of  Kant’s controversial doctrine of  idealism,
including her much-discussed reading of  Kant as a nonconceptualist about intuition1
– one perhaps wonders why a book on Kant’s idealism also discusses the topic of  non-
conceptualism, but on re-reading her arguments in the integrated context of  the
book, it occurred to me that Allais’s nonconceptualist interpretation of  Kant is very
much tied in with her take on Kant’s idealism.
As was to be expected, the book is a first-rate example of  Kant scholarship. It makes
for an exciting reading and offers many insights and openings for new avenues of  ap-
proach to various aspects of  Kant’s philosophy. It is also probably one of  the very few
books on Kant which will be referenced and consulted many years hence; in that
sense it is comparable to Henry Allison’s classic Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An
 Interpretation and Defense.2 Unlike Allison’s magnum opus though, Allais’s book is much
more philosophically reconstructive and much less a close reading of  the text. Of
course, Allais pays due attention to the textual evidence for and against her interpre-
tation, but she also offers many an insight from contemporary philosophical per-
spectives that have prima facie nothing to do with Kant. This is both an advantage and
a problem, as I shall point out further below.
In general, it seems to me that the main and unquestioned assumption behind
 Allais’s interpretation of  Kantian idealism is ultimately a Kant-foreign one. This has
to do with the persistent suspicion among Anglophone readers of  Kant, even among
those aiming to defend some form of  Kantian idealism, of  anything that even re-
sembles traditional idealism, namely the belief  that objects are not real things but
just mental states or constructions out of  mental states. Allais is well aware of  the is-
sues and of  the fact that somehow the idealism in Kant’s transcendental idealism
* L. Allais, Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism & His Realism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015 (hence-
forth: MR), pp. 329. I thank Bob Hanna, Chris Onof  and Scott Stapleford for their extremely helpful comments
on an earlier draft of  this essay.
1 See especially L. Allais, Kant’s One World: Interpreting Transcendental Idealism, «British Journal for the His-
tory of  Philosophy», xii, 4, 2004, pp. 655-684; Eadem, Intrinsic Natures: A Critique of  Langton on Kant, «Philoso-
phy and Phenomenological Research», lxxiii, 1, 2006, pp. 143-169; Eadem, Kant’s Idealism and the Secondary
Quality Analogy, «Journal of  the History of  Philosophy», xlv, 3, 2007, pp. 459-484; and Eadem, Kant, Non-Con-
ceptual Content and the Representation of  Space, «Journal of  the History of  Philosophy» xlvii, 3, 2009, pp. 383-413.
2 H. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, New Haven, Yale University
Press, 1983; second expanded edition, 2004.
T
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must be accommodated, and cannot be explained away. With her book she wanted
to offer a reading that avoids oscillating between the extremes of  phenomenalist/
noumenalist and deflationary non-metaphysical readings of  Kant’s idealism, and
which does justice to Kant’s emphatic empirical realism as well as his commitment to
the existence of  things in themselves.1 Insofar as her reading is able to accommodate
both Kant’s empirical realism and his commitment to the existence of  things in
themselves, she thus avoids ‘merely realist’ readings such as those by Graham Bird
and Robert Hanna.2
I think she indeed succeeds in finding a middle way between the extremes, but at
the cost of  a fundamental aspect of  Kantian idealism, namely subjective agency as an
unmistakable constitutive factor in Kant’s idealist position – this aspect is all but ne-
glected in Allais’s reconstruction, notwithstanding her talk of  the ‘mind-dependence’
of  appearances. And it is here that Allais reveals her own realist bias, if  I may put it
this way, underpinned by her indefatigable endeavour to «reject all readings which
mentalise Kantian appearances».3
This is not an easy criticism on my part, for I find myself  essentially in agreement
with her basic sentiment, based on her correct reading of  Kant’s clear utterances in
this direction, that Kant takes the existence of  things themselves ‘understood neutral-
ly’, as she puts it,4 as existing independently of  our minds, to be the basis from which
we start our analysis of  the possibility of  knowledge of  objects.5 Of  course, as Allais
points out, this does not at all mean that we have access to, much less cognisance of,
the things as they are in themselves; or even that we positively judge that things in them-
selves exist. But the fact that we do not have cognisance of  things in themselves does
not imply that things in themselves do not exist (often thought by commentators).
There is a basic starting assumption in the analysis of  knowledge of  appearances (as
objects), which reveals a commitment, as Kant often says, to there being grounds for
the appearances that we experience and have knowledge of, these grounds being the
things that appear and which have a way of  being in themselves, of  which we do not
have cognisance. But the rightful emphasis on the mind-independent existence of
things themselves notwithstanding, and despite her careful avoidance of  making
problematic claims about the numerical identity of  appearances and things in them-
selves,6 Allais’s effort to de-mentalise Kantian appearances is in my view precisely the
wrong move.
While she sees appearances as populating the realm of  possible experience (of
which she gives a very insightful account in Chapter 6), and as necessarily dependent
on the mind, on possibly being perceived, or as ‘essentially perceptible’,7 Allais is com-
mitted to the anti-phenomenalist view that possible experience is not in any way con-
stituted by a subjective agent, e.g. by way of  its construction out of  mental states, but
is something there to be possibly experienced by an apprehending subject. The problem
here is the assumption that the object (not: the thing itself, the Sache or, more precise-
ly, Sachen, as Kant often says) is already given in intuition, and that the judging  subject
need only apply its conceptual apparatus in order to have thoughts about the object –
1 MR, p. 11. 2 MR, pp. 23, 26, 65ff. 3 MR, p. 38.
4 MR, p. 35. 5 MR, pp. 34-35, 69-70, 89.
6 Cf. MR, pp. 72-73. 7 MR, p. 13.
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and this assumption is clearly confirmed by Allais’s nonconceptualist reading of  Kant
on intuition. But Kant never means to say that the object qua object is already given in
intuition. The central constitutive role of  the subject in Kant’s Copernican turn in
metaphysics seems to have been eliminated in Allais’s account of  his idealism. It is as
if  Allais believes that Kant’s innovation in metaphysics pivots around the idea that the
appearances themselves, i.e. the objects we experience, have an innate disposition to
being experienced by us, and that appearances as objects have no need for subjective
agency for being the perceptual particulars that they are. But before I elaborate on this
critical point, let me first give a quick overview of  the book, so as to give a rough idea
of  its admirable comprehensiveness.
The book consists of  three parts. The first part deals chiefly with issues of  inter-
pretation and differentiating Allais’s own interpretation from the existing literature.
In Chapter 1, she provides a compendium of  her ‘moderate metaphysical’ reading of
idealism.1 Chapter 2 is dedicated to an ardent refutation of  phenomenalism, whether
in its dogmatic, traditional, Berkeleian variety, or ‘sophisticated phenomenalism’.2
The critique of  phenomenalist interpretations of  Kantian idealism is crucial to Allais’s
reading. Chapter 3 critically addresses noumenalist, bare empirically realist, and de-
flationary readings, most importantly that of  Allison.
Part Two presents Allais’s own interpretation. Chapter 5 is meant to make the idea
of  ‘essential manifestness’, central to her interpretation of  Kant’s idealism, philo-
sophically coherent. Allais must make it clear that, in contrast to the phenomenalist
interpretation, there can be mind-dependence which «does not involve existence in
the mind».3 The existence of  ‘essentially manifest’ properties is «not independent of
the possibility of  their being presented to us in a conscious experience».4 To make this
philosophical view fit Kant’s idealism, Allais resorts to Kant’s secondary quality anal-
ogy in the Prolegomena, where Kant seems to deny both that appearances have an ex-
istence outside our representations and that they are mere representations in think-
ing beings.5 Without assessing here the validity of  Allais’s reading of  Kant’s analogy,
it is clear why Allais sees it as providing textual evidence for her reading of  Kantian
appearances in terms of  the ‘essentially manifest’ view, for it suggests an empirical re-
alism about mind-independent objects that are also necessarily perceptible, and thus
in a sense ideal. Chapter 7 looks in detail at Kant’s notion of  intuition. This is impor-
tant for Allais’s ‘essentially manifest’ view of  appearances, since intuitions are by
Kant’s definition singular, immediately referential, and dependent on the given ob-
ject. On Allais’s account, intuitions provide us direct acquaintance with perceptual
particulars (appearances) independently of  any conceptual (categorial) activity on the
subject’s part. This is a key element of  her reading of  Kantian idealism. Chapter 8
considers Kant’s main argument for transcendental idealism in the «Transcendental
Aesthetic» of  the Critique of  Pure Reason.
In Part Three of  the book, Allais investigates in more detail the complex combina-
tion of  realism and idealism in Kant: Chapter 9 deals with the essentially relational
 nature of  the world of  appearances. The sections on (British) anti-realism and
 experience-transcendence and on (American) anti-realism and the ‘manifest image’
1 MR, p. 8. 2 MR, p. 38. 3 MR, p. 101. 4 MR, p. 101; cf. p. 210. 5 MR, p. 128.
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vs. ‘scientific image’ are excellent and cast an illuminating light upon the aspect of
 ‘essential manifestness’ that Allais wishes to emphasise. Chapter 10 is probably the
most speculative in the book, but also the most philosophically satisfying: it deals
specifically with the role that things in themselves play in Kant’s idealism, in particu-
lar the fact that things «have intrinsic, non-relational, categorical natures which
ground their relational appearances».1 Allais deals astutely with a range of  complex
substantive issues in Kant’s account of  the intrinsic nature of  things in themselves,
partly in response to Rae Langton’s highly heterodox reading2 of  twenty years ago.
There are problems though, and some of  them are peculiar to Kant, but I hope to ad-
dress these in more detail in future. Chapter 11 addresses one central argument from
the «Transcendental Deduction», namely the argument that concerns the necessary
application of  the categories so that our thought has ‘relation to an object’. Allais’s
reading of  this is consistent with her account of  intuition as delivering perceptual par-
ticulars and of  the ‘essential manifestness’ of  appearances. I discuss her take on Kant’s
notion of  ‘relation to an object’ in some detail in my own recent book, so won’t deal
with it here.3 In a short final chapter, Allais wraps up the various lines of  her investi-
gation into Kantian idealism and links them to the very idea of  the possibility of  meta-
physics.
Not to diminish the many positive qualities of  Allais’s book, given the limited space
in this notice it seems worthwhile to register a few of  the main problems that I not-
ed down whilst reading. All of  them relate centrally to Kant’s notorious, oft-repeat-
ed and undeniable claim that appearances are mere representations, and thus do not
exist outside the mind. This has often been read as confirming phenomenalist read-
ings of  Kant’s idealism, which roughly hold that objects do not exist outside of  men-
tal states. Clearly, it is difficult to explain away this claim, and any reading that does
not subscribe to phenomenalism in any form must still be able to accommodate the
clear assertion made by Kant with respect to appearances being mere representations.
Allais is fully aware of  this requirement, and so, as part of  her explanation, she de-
votes quite some space to refuting phenomenalism, both the traditional, Berkeleian
kind and the ‘sophisticated’ variant, which holds that objects are, not just mental
states, but rather constructions out of  mental states or in virtue of  mental activity.
 Allais contends that «it is extremely difficult to make sense of  Kant’s position as a
 phenomenalist idealism»,4 which is inconsistent with «many of  Kant’s core philo-
sophical concerns»,5 but it seems to me that despite differentiating dogmatic phe-
nomenalist readings from ‘sophisticated’ phenomenalism, Allais persistently takes
the most traditional, radical form of  phenomenalism, in particular, Strawson’s read-
ing,6 as a foil for her own reading. In her réquisitoire against phenomenalism  Allais pro-
vides no less than seven reasons which in her view show that phenomenalist
 interpretations of  Kantian idealism cannot be right.7 None of  them are damning, I
believe.
1 MR, p. 231.
2 R. Langton, Kant’s Humility: Our Ignorance of  Things in Themselves, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998.
3 See D. Schulting, Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction, London-New
York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, ch. 4.
4 MR, p. 12. 5 MR, p. 20.
6 MR, p. 37. 7 MR, pp. 43ff.
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Let me briefly run through each of  them before elaborating on some of  the prob-
lems I have with Allais’s reading:
(1) Phenomenalist, virtual, or Berkeleian objects «simply do not entail the existence
of  things of  which they are appearances», says Allais.1 This is not necessarily true; a
‘sophisticated’ phenomenalist can perfectly argue that an appearance is not an object
outside the mind, or more accurately, outside the domain that is constituted by a con-
struction out of  mental states or in virtue of  mental activity, without these states as
such being parts of  the object, all the while being committed to a realm of  mind-in-
dependently existing things in themselves being the ground of  the object (whatever
the isomorphic or non-isomorphic relations between thing in itself  and object may
be). There is no need to posit, and no clear textual evidence for positing, an identity
between the object and thing in itself  as being the same thing, something that Allais
seems committed to (even though she does not argue for strict numerical identity).
Reason (2) was not entirely clear to me, but by saying that «Kant could not hold
that objects exist as mental items but do not have the properties they have in sensa-
tion»,2 Allais seems to think that, on a phenomenalist interpretation, there is an
 insurmountable problem with the objective validity or veridicality of  objects as men-
tal entities. But this objection, if  I understand her correctly, rests on the assumption
of  a very dogmatic form of  phenomenalism; Kantian phenomenalism can be read in
such a way that the object that is defined by the synthetic unity among representa-
tions, or mental states, is not defined by the representations united, and whereby the
intensional magnitude of  the representations, i.e. sensations, is taken to point to the
 affecting thing in itself, not to the subject’s state. Phenomenalism is by no means con-
demned to psychologism. Indeed, as Allais herself  notes, «sophisticated phenome-
nalism […] need not attribute to objects-as-constructions-out-of-mental-items all the
properties which are had by the mental items».3
(3) The third reason Allais gives is that phenomenalism cannot really accommodate
Kant’s view that the spatial objects we experience are publicly accessible objects.4 It
is of  course true that «[s]ince space and time constitute the framework that enables
us to have empirical intuitions, they cannot be a construction out of  what is given in
intuition».5 But still, as Allais notes herself, Kant is quite clear as to the fact that space
and time, and all that exists in them, and so the very publicness of  spatiotemporal ob-
jects, is ‘in me’ (KrV, A 375); a good Kantian phenomenalist will note that of  course
this is a transcendental ‘in me’, not an empirical one; however, this does not at all im-
ply that the public object can exist only in the way that Allais thinks possible, namely
as a property of  the thing itself  ‘understood neutrally’, and not as a construction out
of  mental states or in virtue of  mental activity (the unity of  apperception). It could
in fact be argued that the manner in which Allais considers the ‘essential manifestness’
of  appearances, namely in terms of  possible experience,6 is mutatis mutandis not so
far apart from the possible experience that is constituted by the objectivity that,
 according to ‘sophisticated’ Kantian phenomenalism, is defined by the synthetic
 construction out of  mental states or in virtue of  mental activity, i.e. transcendental
apperception (albeit that the crucial difference between Allais’s objectivist take on
1 MR, p. 44. 2 MR, pp. 44-45. 3 MR, p. 45.
4 MR, p. 46. 5 MR, p. 47. 6 MR, p. 137.
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possible experience in contrast to the subjectivism of  the phenomenalist view re-
mains; see further below).
(4) «Very small things, very distant things, and entities posited by science», which
are part of  empirical reality for Kant, though cannot actually be perceived, cannot be
accommodated by Berkeleian phenomenalism.1 But as Allais herself  says, ‘sophisti-
cated’ phenomenalists can deal with these. So this reason is irrelevant, if  we consid-
er the latter rather than the former form of  phenomenalism. Moreover, Berkeley
himself  does in fact address the problem of  very small things and distant things as well
as entities posited by science.2
(5) A potentially far more damning reason against phenomenalism of  any stripe is
Kant’s argument in the «Analogies», as Allais believes.3 For empirically real objects ex-
ist at all times, unperceived, and stand in causal relations.4 Constructivist phenome-
nalists might accommodate the arguments of  the «Analogies», but Allais says that
«the fact that, rightly or wrongly, phenomenalists think their view can accommodate
the central claims Kant makes about external objects cannot be taken to show that
Kant is a phenomenalist».5 But this would appear to be question-begging. The fact
that Kant’s argument in the «Analogies» appears to confirm Allais’s realist reading of
empirical objects does not show her reading to be the right one, and not the phenom-
enalist reading. For her reading of  the «Analogies» might be mistaken. In fact, it stands
to reason to give preference to a ‘sophisticated’ phenomenalist reading of  the «Analo-
gies» when one takes into account the fact that it is the transcendental unity of  ap-
perception that is the necessary ground of  the principles of  all three analogies (KrV,
A 177 B 220), in line with Kant’s general argument in the «Deduction» as well as the
«Principles of  Experience» that determinate space, nature, etc. are all nothing but
functions of  the transcendental unity of  apperception, given sensory input. Seen in
this light, a phenomenal substance is not something given, but in a sense a construc-
tion out of  representations or in virtue of  transcendental apperception which gives
our perceptions objective validity pertaining to empirically real objects and events in
space and time.
Allais writes that the phenomenalist reading is something that can only be «read
 into the text, not something Kant himself  ever says».6 But this is an uncharitable way
of  weighing interpretations against each other; of  course, phenomenalism is an
 interpretation, but so is Allais’s reading. If  we could rely solely on what Kant actually
says, there would be no need for interpretation at all, and everything would be  simple.
Allais points to the fact that phenomenalist interpreters such as James Van Cleve and
Paul Guyer find Kant to be inconsistent in the «Analogies», that is, their phenome-
nalist reading of  Kant overall is found to be incompatible with the apparently realist
thrust of  the «Analogies». She argues that this inconsistency «provides very strong
 evidence that Kant is not a phenomenalist».7 But of  course, Van Cleve and Guyer
might be completely wrong about the incompatibility of  the «Analogies» and the
 phenomenalist reading, just because they could be wrong about the realist thrust of
the «Analogies» (as a matter of  fact, I do believe they are wrong about this, but that
1 MR, p. 47. 2 Thanks to Scott Stapleford for pointing this out.
3 MR, pp. 48-50. 4 MR, p. 48. 5 MR, p. 49.
6 MR, p. 50. 7 Ibidem.
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is a topic for another occasion). So the «Analogies» do not at all eo ipso provide a  basis
for dismissing phenomenalism.
(6) Allais’s sixth reason against phenomenalist readings of  Kant’s idealism is that we
«do not cognize mental states as they are in themselves».1 But this seems irrelevant
for the constructivist or ‘sophisticated’ phenomenalist, despite Allais’s claim that on
their reading, constructions out of  mental states «would have to be either construc-
tions out of  empirical mental states or constructions out of  noumenal mental states»,
where the «former is straightforwardly false», because «empirical objects are not de-
pendent on empirical states», and the «latter is problematic because we do not know
anything about subjects as they are in themselves or mental states as they are in them-
selves».2 But clearly, according to the constructivist Kantian phenomenalist, objects
do not depend on the empirical mental states, let alone noumenal mental states, but
are first produced and purely a function of  the activity of  the apperceiving subject,
given sensory input from outside (i.e. from the things in themselves that affect us). So it is not
the empirical content of  the mental states as such, but the transcendental functions
of  generating a synthetic unity among one’s representations, which constitutes the
constructed object. Questions about the noumenal status of  our mental states or
 ourselves as subjects are further completely irrelevant.
(7) The last reason Allais gives that counts against phenomenalism is the very fact
that Kant refuted Berkeley’s idealism, which according to her «gives us extremely
strong grounds to reject any mentalised reading of  appearances».3 She suggests that
Kant never accuses Berkeley of  leaving out the things in themselves.4 But he in fact
does, and it is to all appearances Kant’s main complaint; he writes in the Prolegomena:
«The existence of  the thing that appears is thereby not destroyed, as in genuine ideal-
ism, but it is only shown that we cannot possibly know it by the senses as it is in itself»
(Prol, AA iv 289).5 Towards the end of  Remark III appended to the First Part of  the
Prolegomena, Kant writes, while mentioning Berkeley as well as Descartes just prior:
«My idealism concerns not the existence of  things (the doubting of  which, however, con-
stitutes idealism in the ordinary sense), since it never came into my head to doubt it; but
it concerns the sensuous representation of  things, to which space and time especial-
ly belong. Regarding space and time and consequently, regarding all appearances in
general, I have only shown that they are neither things (but are mere modes of
 representation [Vorstellungsarten]) nor are they determinations belonging to things in
themselves [den Sachen an sich selbst angehörige Bestimmungen]» (Prol, AA iv 293).6
Kant’s problem with Berkeley is with his denial of  the mind-independent existence
of  things in themselves, not with the mental status of  appearances. Moreover, in the
Prolegomena parallel of  the refutation of  Cartesian idealism, Kant in fact affirms his
phenomenalist view of  the «actuality of  bodies as external appearances in space»
(Prol, AA iv 336),7 which, as Allais rightly says, in Kant’s view we are directly aware of.
1 Ibidem. 2 MR, p. 51.
3 MR, p. 52, emphasis added. 4 MR, p. 54.
5 I quote from Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. and ed. by P. Carus, rev. by J. Ellington, Indi-
anapolis, Hackett Publishing, 1977, p. 33, emphasis added.
6 Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, p. 37, emphasis added.
7 Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, p. 77.
198 discussioni
That is, «the concept ‘outside us’ only signifies existence in space» (Prol, AA iv 337),1 the
application of  which «admits of  a satisfactory proof» of  something empirical outside
us (Prol, AA iv 336),2 whence Kant can consistently say that «the question of  whether
bodies (as appearances of  outer sense) exist outside my thoughts [außer meinen
Gedanken] as bodies in nature can without hesitation be answered negatively» (Prol,
AA iv 337).3 It is hard to see how Allais can make sense of  this last passage. When Kant
says in a similar context that «appearances are not things, but rather nothing but rep-
resentations, and [that] they cannot exist at all outside our mind» (KrV, A 492 B 520),4
Allais skews this towards her own interpretation as saying that Kant «clearly and ex-
plicitly states that appearances are mind-dependent».5 This has the appearance of
making the text fit one’s interpretation, rather than taking the text at face value.
There is quite a difference between saying that appearances «cannot exist at all out-
side our mind» and saying that they are mind-dependent.
Let me elaborate on this last point a bit. It is a hallmark of  Allais’s interpretation to
think of  appearances as the mind-dependent «aspects of  things which also have a way
they are in themselves».6 First, appearances are, for Kant, never ‘aspects’ of  things.7
There is of  course something intuitively appealing about Allais’s interpretation, for it
recognises the undoubted mind-independence of  the things that we experience, which
thus have relation to us and have a way in which they are independent of  us, are related
inwardly (which is what an sich means, as Hegel was quick to take up and expand upon).
But my problem with Allais’s reading is that she is intent on de-mentalising appear-
ances, and making them somehow determinations, properties, or aspects of  the things
 themselves, albeit not of  the things qua having a way of  being in themselves (an sich).
One way of  preserving Allais’s valuable view that the things we experience are both
mind-dependent in the way that they necessarily relate to us and mind-independent
in the way that they have an existence in themselves, is to say that appearances are in-
deed the appearances of things themselves, so of  things that also have a way of  being
in themselves, but rather than saying that they are aspects of  the things themselves,
they must be identified with the representations that we have of  the things; that is, ap-
pearances are nothing but these representations  – this accounts for Kant’s claim that
appearances are mere representations and do not exist outside the representing mind.
Appearances are not aspects of  things, but they are the representations we have of
things, inasmuch as the representations we have of  things are the appearances. (Note
that strictly speaking we do not represent the appearances, which on a straightfor-
ward reading of  Kant’s claim that appearances are mere representations, would in fact
be tautological: we would then be representing representations. Rather, the appear-
ances are our representations of  things.)8
1 Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, p. 78, emphasis added.
2 Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, p. 77.
3 I here quote the translation of  the Prolegomena in I. Kant, Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, ed. and trans. by
H. Allison et alii, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 128.
4 I quote from Critique of  Pure Reason, trans. and ed. by P. Guyer and A. Wood, Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1998, p. 511. 5 MR, p. 57. 6 MR, p. 75, emphasis added.
7 Cf. Prolegomena, AA iv 293: «Erscheinungen [sind] nicht Sachen (sondern bloße Vorstellungsarten), auch
nicht den Sachen an sich selbst angehörige Bestimmungen […]» (emphasis added).
8 See further D. Schulting, In Defence of  Reinhold’s Kantian Representationalism: Aspects of  Idealism in
 «Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens», «Kant Yearbook», viii, 2016, pp. 87-116.
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This can be made clear by a passage that Allais also quotes, but needless to say in-
terprets differently; the passage is in the second Remark of  the First Part of  the Pro-
legomena. Kant writes: «There are things given to us as objects of  our senses existing
outside us, yet we know nothing of  them as they may be in themselves, but are ac-
quainted only with their appearances, i.e., with the representations that they produce
in us because they affect our senses. Accordingly, I by all means avow that there are
bodies outside us, i.e., things [Dinge] which, though completely unknown to us as to
what they may be in themselves, we know through the representations which their
influence on our sensibility provides for us, and to which we give the name of  a body
[denen wir die Benennung eines Körpers geben – which word therefore [also] merely sig-
nifies the appearance of  this object [Gegenstandes] that is unknown to us but is
nonetheless real» (Prol, AA iv 289).1
Grammatically, the relative pronoun denen in the second sentence in the above-
quoted passage can refer to the distant antecedent ‘things’ in the first-degree relative
clause of  that sentence as well as to ‘representations’ in the embedded relative clause,
but dialectically, given what Kant says in the parenthetical last clause, in particular his
use of  the adverb also, I think it should be taken to refer to ‘representations’. Kant thus
should be taken to say that «there are bodies outside us, i.e., things which [we do not
know as they are in themselves, but] […] we know through the representations […]
to which we give the name of  a body». This statement usefully explains to us how the
notion of  an external body should be understood idealistically. If, by contrast, denen
were taken to refer to Dinge, Kant would be saying that «there are bodies outside us,
i.e., things […] which we give the name of  a body», which from a hermeneutical per-
spective is either trivial, circular or does not make sense, hence there is good reason
to reject it as a possible reading. Kant is not trying to say that we call things bodies be-
cause they are bodies, but he is trying to explain the easily misunderstood complica-
tion of  his idealism: there are bodies out there, which are things we do not know as
to how they are in themselves, but we know them as they appear, namely in the form
of  and only in the form of the representations we have of  them, as appearances, and it
is these appearances, i.e. representations, we call bodies. Hence he says in the paren-
thetical clause that the term ‘body’ really refers to appearance.2
Allais of  course believes that appearances as spatiotemporal bodies are aspects of
things, albeit not qua their having a way of  being in themselves, but I think that this
possibility is not available to Allais on the basis of  the above-quoted passage from the
Prolegomena, if  read in the way I propose. Appearances are mere representations,
which we call bodies. Hence, bodies are mere representations.3 What we represent
of  the things themselves, which have a way of  being in themselves (an sich), are their
appearances. But – and here I fundamentally diverge from Allais – their appearances
are what and only what we represent of  the things, and nothing beyond the represen-
1 I. Kant, Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, p. 84.
2 In the «Fourth Paralogism» in the A-edition of  the Critique, Kant is even clearer as to the fact that «exter-
nal objects (bodies) are merely appearances, hence also nothing other than a species of  my representations, whose
objects are something only through these representations, but are nothing separated from them» (KrV, A 370,
quoted from Critique of  Pure Reason, p. 427).
3 See also my critique of  Tobias Rosefeldt on this point in D. Schulting, In Defence of  Reinhold’s Kantian
Representationalism, p. 89 n. 3.
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tations. There is a strict reciprocity between ‘what we represent of  the things them-
selves are their appearances’ and ‘their appearances are what we represent of  the
things themselves’. This is a straightforward reading of  Kant’s elephant in the room,
i.e. the identificatory claim that appearances are mere representations. A straightfor-
ward reading trumps any roundabout reading of  this claim, such as Allais’s reading
that in saying that appearances as aspects of  things only exist if  it is possible to expe-
rience or perceive them, appearances are mere representations. Moreover, the
straightforward, ‘sophisticated’ phenomenalist reading can perfectly accommodate
reading Kant as a direct realist of  sorts about external objects in space, because any
appearance as represented in space in virtue of  outer sense exists in space and is ex-
perienced by us as such (cf. KrV, A 370). Kant on a phenomenalist reading is perfectly
capable of  enabling a relationalist theory of  perception within the framework of  tran-
scendental idealism, in virtue of  the differentiation between inner and outer sense,
without needing to resort to hermeneutic accessories such as the secondary quality
analogy or theories about ‘essential manifestness’.
An additional benefit of  the straightforward reading is that there is no problem in
clarifying the explanatory gap between the mind-independence of  the appearing
thing and the mind-dependence of  the appearance of  the same thing. This is one of
the problematic aspects of  Allais’s reading: there is an unexplained discrepancy be-
tween the mind-independence and mind-dependence of  the very same thing, which
is only partially explained by Allais’s otherwise helpful account of  intrinsicality and
relationality in Chapters 10 and 11. Further, the very label of  ‘mind-dependence’
would seem to underdetermine the involvement of  subjective agency in the consti-
tution of  appearances as necessarily objects of  possible experience, which defines the
mind-dependence, and is therefore rather stipulative. The straightforward ‘sophisti-
cated’ phenomenalist reading is not affected by this problem because the mind-de-
pendence of  the appearance is directly in virtue of  its being identified with the sub-
ject’s representations or combinatorial representational activity, i.e. outer sense as the
necessary subjective form of  any intuition of  an object, i.e. an appearance, and the
unity of  apperception as the necessary subjective form of  any object qua object, i.e. a
determinate appearance.
At a certain point Allais muses about the proper translation for the very term ‘rep-
resentation’ (Vorstellung), suggesting ‘presentation’ as an alternative, and says that «the
term ‘representation’ could be used simply to emphasise the fact that perception in-
volves things appearing a certain way for subjects: it presents things to subjects».1 The
mind-dependent properties an object has (qua appearance) «will depend on minds if
minds (conscious perceptual subjects) are essential to the relation in which the pre-
sented property exists».2 Allais wants to stress the necessary dependence on experi-
ence by subjects for the existence of  appearance properties in order to keep the ide-
alism on board. But the above quotes sound as if, on her account, the subject were
just another necessary objective entity or part in the constellation of  properties and
ways of  their necessarily and only being presented in possible experience. The active
constitutive role of  the subject in the formation of  objectively valid representations
or veridical perception of  particulars is thereby wholly excised.
1 MR, p. 115. 2 Ibidem.
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Similarly, a relational account, according to Allais, «can say that perceptual experi-
ence represents objects to us»1 and that external objects «are present in conscious
mental states when we perceive them», «which is not a matter of  being merely a mod-
ification of  a subject’s internal state».2 But how is this supposed to avoid mentalising
appearances, for is perceptual experience not always something had by experiencing
subjects only, if  there is perceptual experience?
In characterising the mind-dependent way of  presenting something mind-inde-
pendent as the duality of  perceptual experience and the ‘presentation’ of  objects ‘to
us’, Allais creates another level of  confusion. How should we explain the relation ex-
pressed in the preposition ‘to’ in «represents […] to us»? Apparently, there is not just
a relation between (a) the thing as it is in itself  (an sich) and the way it appears to us,
but also between (b) the way the thing appears to us in a perceptual experience and
the way in which the appearance that appears to us in a perceptual experience is ap-
prehended by us as the perceptual agents of  experience. The relation in a is difficult
if  not impossible to assess, since Kant forbids us cognisance of  this relation (see Chap-
ter 10 of  the book). The relation in b is supposed to be one of  identity or presumably
it is unproblematic (in the sense of  the Act Theory that says that any experience nec-
essarily entails an agent of  experience), and on the phenomenalist reading this is in-
deed unproblematic for the appearances literally are eo ipso representations had by a
subject. But for Allais there is an additional explanatory gap, namely the gap that aris-
es as a result of  the question of  how the perceptual experience presenting objects to
us relates to the appearances being represented by us, in our minds. The gapless identi-
ty reading of  relation b is not available to Allais, for she crucially denies the mentalis-
ing of  appearances: the possible perceptual experience as the field of  appearances is
uncoupled from the subjective agent of  experience that formulates thoughts about
what she experiences. Fearing a phenomenalist/mentalist reduction of  appearances
as independent objects but intent on honouring Kant’s emphatic idealism, in one way
or another, Allais’s solution to the question of  the status of  appearances as «the mind-
dependent way something mind-independent is presented to us»3 is a halfway house
that belies Kant’s transcendental turn, which pivots around the question of  how we
are able to have a priori cognition of  objects, a question that can be answered in two
mutually exclusionary ways only: «either […] the object alone makes the representa-
tion possible or […] the representation alone makes the object possible» (KrV, A 92 B
124-125). It seems Allais has just moved around the original explanatory problem with-
out choosing either alternative.
Allais’s ‘essential manifestness’ reading of  appearances either is problematic be-
cause it places the object (appearance) outside the subject’s perspective, if  we focus
on the anti-mentalising thesis, or it is not as novel as she claims it to be, if  we take her
claim seriously that what she means by ‘essential manifestness’ is that objects are
 present in conscious mental states or that the possibility of  appearances is necessari-
ly dependent on their possibly being perceived by subjects, for this latter way of
putting it is perfectly accommodated by a ‘sophisticated’ phenomenalist reading that
sees appearances as spatial objects of  outer sense, but without the hedging around
1 MR, p. 133. 2 MR, p. 134. 3 MR, p. 133.
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the appearances = representations identification. When Allais repeats her point that
«the fact that phenomenalists, rightly or wrongly, think that they can capture every-
thing that Kant says about external objects in terms of  claims about possible sensa-
tions does not show that Kant is a phenomenalist»,1 this comes across as somewhat
silly, for on this reasoning no interpretation can lay claim to being a better fit than any
other, including Allais’s own reading. It seems that to her phenomenalists must be
wrong, even if  they were found to be right.
Abstract
In this critical notice of  Lucy Allais’s recent monograph on Kantian idealism I focus on her
refutation of  phenomenalism, which is important for her metaphysical-realist reading of  ap-
pearances. She provides 7 reasons for rejecting phenomenalist readings of  Kant’s idealism
about appearances. I argue that none of  these reasons are compelling. Notwithstanding the
many valuable features of  Allais’s interpretation of  Kant’s idealism overall, her effort to de-
mentalise Kantian appearances is in my view precisely the wrong move.
1 MR, p. 139.
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